International centres of excellence (ICE) in which foreign research organizations are attracted to developing and emerging countries via dedicated funding schemes to support technological catching-up and strengthening of innovation systems, can have benefits for both host countries and their international research partners through knowledge spill-overs and business opportunities. As analysis of the process of setting up such ICEs is limited, the contribution of this study is assessing the enactment of such innovation policies aimed at inducing cross-border collaboration for R&D and innovation. This is done by investigating stakeholders' perceptions on the establishment and early functioning of Chile's ICE programme. The principal finding is that setting up and operating an ICE requires absorptive capacity of different kinds: not only to embed research and innovations ensuing from an ICE in the host country innovation system, but also to build capacities for operationalizing cross-border collaboration in an ICE and dealing with the dual embeddedness of ICE in both the host country and the home countries of the foreign research organizations. The latter type of absorptive capacity needs to be built both in the research organizations involved, and in the funding agencies enacting the innovation policy instruments that induce ICEs. Dedicated brokers facilitating such cross-border collaboration by bridging institutional and cultural gaps and supporting learning between partners, could be useful in this regard.
Introduction
A large body of literature has now emerged on the internationalization of research and development (R&D) through different forms such as international collaboration, outsourcing and offshoring (e.g. Georghiou 1998; Manning et al. 2008; Von Zedtwitz et al. 2004) . Whereas initially mainly multinational companies placed R&D facilities outside their home countries (Narula and Zanfei 2004) , in recent years universities and applied research organizations (sometimes also referred to as Research and Technology OrganizationsRTOs) have also become engaged in the global generation of innovations (Berger and Hofer 2011; Li et al. 2016a; Pfotenhauer et al. 2016) . Traditionally, most international investment in R&D was confined to developed countries, both as host countries (i.e. attracting R&D facilities from organizations located abroad) and as home countries (i.e. national organizations going to other countries to establish R&D facilities there). Since the early 2000s however, developing and emerging countries have become more active players in global science and innovation networks, although this trend is mostly confined to large emerging countries (Bruche 2009; Manning et al. 2008) .
From a supply-side perspective, companies have several motivations for engaging in R&D internationalization and establishing collaborations with developing and emerging countries: tapping into a global talent pool, being closer to markets and customers' demands, access to technology, and sometimes cost reduction (Dachs et al. 2014; Guim on 2009) . Examples of internationalization of companies include the setting up of R&D centres in other countries (Von Zedtwitz et al. 2004) or engaging in developing knowledge service clusters in emerging countries (Manning et al. 2008) . More recently, a growing number of universities and applied research organizations have been establishing R&D institutes, 'hubs' or 'antennas' in foreign locations, with different interaction modalities or collaboration architectures (Berger and Hofer 2011; Pfotenhauer et al. 2016; Zacharewicz et al. 2017) . This internationalization strategy is sometimes driven by procurement needs, as domestic markets become too small to support the size of the organization (Berger and Hofer 2011; Jonkers and Cruz-Castro 2010; Sharif and Baark 2011; Zacharewicz et al. 2017) .
The literature has paid ample attention to internationalization strategies from a supply-side perspective, but now attention is also beginning to be paid to the demand side. From a demand-side perspective, a key issue for many developing and emerging countries is how to benefit from the internationalization of R&D and attract foreign R&D to strengthen their national science and innovation capacity (Archibugi and Pietrobelli 2003; Manning et al. 2010; Nelson 2007) . Some reported examples of initiatives launched by emerging countries' governments include: Singapore's Campus for Research Excellence and Technological Enterprise (CREATE), launched in 2006, in which 10 universities (including MIT, UC Berkeley, and Cambridge University) from six different countries have established new research centres in Singapore and are now collaborating closely with local universities and firms in applied research oriented towards the country's strategic industries and technologies (Sidhu et al. 2014) ; the Australian Monash University's research institute in IT and engineering established in China in 2014; the University of Michigan and Peking University Joint Institute for Translational and Clinical Research, established in 2010 (Kolars et al. 2016; Sharma 2016) ; the Masdar Institute of Science and Technology in the United Arab Emirates targeted at developing an international centre for advanced energy research.
Although the outcomes of R&D attraction programmes have been described in terms of their set-up, there is limited empirical analysis of the process of setting up and enacting such programmes. This is where the originality of this study lies and where it intends to make its contribution, responding to calls from the literature to acquire more insights about the enactment of innovation policy instruments enabling the attraction of foreign R&D (e.g. by providing funding and enabling matchmaking) in the context of developing and emerging countries that are strengthening their science and innovation systems Pfotenhauer et al. 2016) . In order to make this contribution, we present a study on the case of Chile. This emerging country has recently designed and implemented a specific innovation policy instrument to attract foreign R&D in the form of an International Centres of Excellence (ICE) programme.
In general, Centres of Excellence focus on building a critical mass in research, attracting the best scientists and students, producing high impact science, and having positive spill-overs on firms' innovation capacity through the production of highly skilled human resources and technology transfer (Guim on 2013; Hellströ m 2011 Hellströ m , 2014 Langfeldt et al. 2015; OECD 2014) . Hellströ m (2014) distinguishes three main types of Centres of Excellence with different scopes and strategic aims: those focused on 1) basic research with the strategic aim of supporting the development of 'frontier fields of science' and internationally competitive (world class) research capabilities; 2) innovation and advanced technological development with the strategic aim of supporting strategic and applications-oriented R&D with potential industrial applications to generate innovation (i.e. bridging the gap between researchers and users by bringing together research and industry), sometimes with a focus on government-defined priority areas; and 3) social and economic development with the strategic aim of achieving world-class research capacity to address social and economic issues of national importance and generate qualified human resource capacity, which, rather than exclusively focusing on supporting basic science capability and industrial innovation, is about improving the skills of researchers across the community and training young researchers in areas of national priority.
After launching a first programme in 1999 which focused on creating domestic Centres of Excellence (Guim on, 2013), Chile introduced its ICE programme in 2009. This programme aimed to establish ICEs by attracting foreign research organizations to establish in the country and forge alliances with local universities, applied research organizations and firms. These ICEs can be characterized as the second type described by Hellströ m (2014), i.e. with the purpose of contributing to innovation and advanced technological development, and can be considered as what Pfotenhauer et al. (2016) have referred to as a Complex International Science, Technology and Innovation Partnership. The aim of this study is to assess early experiences of the Chilean ICE programme as an explicit innovation policy instrument to stimulate the connection of an emerging country's innovation system with global R&D. The specific questions that guided our enquiry were:
1. How was the ICE programme designed and why were certain design options taken? 2. What kind of early achievements and outcomes have been achieved in the early years of the programme's operation, according to stakeholders? 3. What initial challenges have emerged relating to operationalizing the International Centres of Excellence and how have these been addressed, according to stakeholders?
The article continues by providing a brief analytical framework against which to assess different elements of the enactment of an ICE programme to strengthen capacity for innovation and advanced technological development.
Analytical framework
2.1 ICEs for strengthening capacity for innovation and advanced technological development: design choices Selecting the most appropriate design for an ICE is a complex task that requires a realistic assessment of the host country's technological capabilities, broad-based consultations with experts and a delicate balancing of the potentially conflicting interests of different stakeholders (Beerkens 2009; Hellströ m 2014) . As indicated earlier, we focus here on an ICE targeted towards strengthening capacity for innovation and advanced technological development, as this is the goal of the Chilean ICE programme.
In general, Centres of Excellence may differ considerably in size, institutional set-up and scope, and strategic orientation and aims (see Guim on 2013 and Hellströ m 2014 for an overview), but they are generally characterized by a proportion of core institutional funding complemented by project funding, sometimes through external competitive funding schemes (Langfeldt et al. 2015) . The many possible design choices must consider the target population and the scope of the programme, the timeline for public funding, the kind of support services to be offered in addition to funding, as well as types of linkages to be promoted (Hellströ m 2014). The design options relating to functions and objectives of an ICE may be determined by issues such as expressed stakeholder preferences, availability of information on design options, institutional context, political constraints, or mere historical chance (Pfotenhauer et al. 2016) . Different options exist at every step of the programme's life cycle and should ideally be made explicit and consciously weighed up by policymakers, but may also include arbitrary choices or serendipity. For ICEs focused on innovation and advanced technological development, the typical institutional and operational mechanisms are listed in Table 1. 2.2 Attracting foreign R&D partners into ICEs as a mechanism for technological catch-up: potential advantages, challenges, and risks Despite the scarcity of literature specifically on ICEs, from the separate bodies of literature on Centres of Excellence, R&D internationalization, and international science and innovation partnerships, a number of potential advantages and also challenges as regards the involvement of foreign partners in ICE can be distilled. Advantages are mainly in terms of knowledge spill-over and capacity building for innovation and advanced technological development:
-From the perspective of mainly host countries, an advantage of the attraction of global R&D is that it can facilitate the absorption of foreign knowledge and strengthen national technological capabilities, which is of special importance for developing and emerging countries (Beerkens 2009; Fu et al. 2011; Manning et al. 2008 Manning et al. , 2010 . From a systemic perspective, the arrival of foreign R&D organizations can contribute to addressing existing inefficiencies in the national innovation system, for example by fostering university-industry collaboration or by accelerating the development of a critical mass in certain strategic technologies.
-From the perspective of both host country and foreign partner, the mobilization of complementary expertise, building international networks for research and innovation, and strengthening the international position of partners (both host country and foreign) in the ICE are of key advantage. This collaboration between host country and foreign partner institutions may enhance the reputation of both • Funding (from which sources will it be funded? for how many years?) Application, selection and funding
• Two-or three-stage selection processes including pre-proposals. An international panel makes final selection, sometimes with participation of private sector representatives • Evaluation criteria include scientific worth, structural potential and organizational viability, impact and fit with host institution(s), innovation capacity and contribution to competitiveness of national industries • 5-10 year funding timelines, where the funder provides 40-100% of total funding and the remainder is matched by host institutions and external stakeholders/partners, often with a gradual decrease in base funding • In some cases, no requirements to attract matching funding although industry cooperation may be a funding condition Implementation and governance
• Governance involves steering committees, an international advisory board, and/or combination of ministerial oversight and local leadership groups. There may be mixed governance boards including business partners, sometimes with a requirement that the board has a majority of external partners and reflects the stakeholders involved • Demands for specific organizational forms may include coherent milieus (under one roof), unitary leadership, multidisciplinary teams, and integration with the host institution(s), with different degrees of integration between host institutions and foreign partners • The structure must be able to manage complex research and commercialization activities. Often the structure may be flexible, consisting of several smaller research groups • Centres often have to plan, and use part of their budget, for cooperation Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
• Mid-term and final evaluations as well as annual reviews focusing on financial and operational monitoring • M&E topics:
• Scientific outputs (patents, publications, etc.)
• Innovation outputs (contracts with industry, patent licensing, creation of spinoffs, etc.)
• Organizational capabilities (internal collaboration, management structure)
• Strategic capacity (situational awareness and clear vision, executive capacity)
• Resource strategies (external acquisition and internal allocation)
• External cooperation and networking (quality of partners, sustainability of partnerships, crosssectoral cooperation)
• Human capital base (academic leadership, recruitment policy)
• Epistemic capability (access to knowledge, intellectual coherence, learning mechanisms, multidisciplinary collaboration, intellectual synergies) • M&E organization:
• Ongoing monitoring by commissioner and centres themselves • Commissioned evaluations to assess progress partners, and this can lead to an increased number of students, training for companies or commissioned research assignments. The physical presence of foreign partners in the ICE may also lead to spinoffs and assignments/projects in areas outside those of the ICE. Several challenges and risks can also be identified in the literature; these relate mainly to making international collaboration in ICEs work (i.e. in relation to implementation and governance) and ensuring that benefits are well distributed, including the following:
-One of the biggest challenges is the long-term and sustained effort needed to accrue returns on an ICE programme (Hellströ m 2011), and hence it is important for the government to make a strong commitment to sustain the project for at least 10 years (Guim on 2013; Hellströ m 2014). In addition, efforts throughout the project lifecycle are needed to move the ICEs towards financial sustainability, balancing public and private funding, and increasing their degree of self-sufficiency through other income sources, such as technology commercialization, research contracts, consulting, and additional sources of competitive funding (Guim on 2013; Hellströ m 2014).
-Related to the previous challenge, benefits associated with foreign R&D attraction do not accrue automatically; a threshold level of absorptive capacity is required in order to tap into the potential externalities (Criscoulo and Narula 2008; Filippetti et al. 2016) . Absorptive capacity can be defined as the ability to acquire, assimilate, and exploit knowledge developed elsewhere (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) . This implies that the strategies to connect with foreign sources of knowledge need to be synchronized with policies that enhance absorptive capacity.
-There may also be challenges associated with the heterogeneity of ICE partners coming from different countries, cultures, and organizational and institutional backgrounds (e.g. sciences, business, government, civic society group). These may, for example, lead to conflicts due to use of different jargon, different working styles, different incentives, and diverging expectations and interests (Beerkens 2009; Georghiou 1998; Klerkx et al. 2017; Niu 2014; Von Zedtwitz et al. 2004; Zacharewicz et al. 2017 ).
-A key risk is the potential loss of control over domestic innovative capacity (of host country), leading to a higher external dependency. Scholars and policy practitioners often advocate for science and technology transfer as a motor for economic growth, but critics have argued that such top-down, North-South technology transfers tend to reproduce hierarchies that perpetuate dependency (Barandiaran 2015) .
Case study selection and research methods
Many countries in Latin America have intensified efforts in recent years to strengthen their national innovation systems and make these more mature in a process of catching-up (e.g. Dutrénit and Arza 2010; Klerkx et al. 2015; Rapini et al. 2009 ). With similar objectives to support catching-up as those R&D attraction efforts in Asia mentioned in the introduction, Chile's ICE programme was the first of its kind in Latin America and represents a relevant case study in this regard (see also an earlier brief description of experiences in Guim on et al. 2016). The ICE programme was launched in 2009 by Corporaci on de Fomento (CORFO), Chile's national development and innovation agency. Given that impacts take time to materialize, our research can only aspire to provide an account of stakeholders' perceptions of the programme's early experiences in terms of achievements and challenges, to reflect on design choices and implementation issues rather than a comprehensive evaluation of its impact and outcomes.
This case study focuses principally on experience from not only ICEs emerging from the first call, leading to four ICEs, but also incorporates insights from the second call. It relies on a combination of secondary data (including official documents and websites) and a set of personal, semi-structured interviews with key informants as regards their perceptions of, and experiences with, the Chilean ICE programme. The interviews were conducted between 2014 and 2016, lasted one hour on average and included 14 relevant actors representing different stakeholders connected to, or with knowledge of, the implementation of the ICE programme. The interviewees were selected as key informants to discuss their experience and their broader perceptions on the programme's virtues and challenges. In an effort to benefit from triangulation, the set of interviewees included different stakeholders such as the public officers involved in the programme's design, implementation, and evaluation; the executive directors of all four ICEs established through the programme's first call; the director of one of the ICEs established through the second call; a representative of a foreign institution that applied for the programme but was not selected; and other highlevel policymakers (Appendix 1). As part of the research design, quotes with opinions from key informants are anonymized in this publication to enable critical discussion.
Findings
Using elements from the framework developed in Section 2 as an analytical lens, this section discusses stakeholder perceptions and initial experiences of the Chilean ICE programme in its different stages: (i) how the programme was designed and the trade-offs that needed to be addressed in the design stage; (ii) how the ICEs to be funded were selected; (iii) how the programme was implemented and the results achieved in its first years of operation; (iv) how the programme is monitored and evaluated.
Design stage
The rationale for the ICE programme follows from recent innovation policy developments in Chile. Over the last decades, promoting R&D and innovation has become an increasingly important priority within the Chilean government's strategies to increase competitiveness and economic growth (Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism 2010, 2014) , in which there were two particular arguments for setting up the ICE programme:
Firstly, given the country's relatively small size and its low level of investment in R&D, 1 the government has been trying to build a critical mass by concentrating resources in a few strategic scientific fields and in a limited number of research organizations to avoid fragmentation. Along these lines, in 2006, the government launched a programme to provide baseline funding to Scientific and Technological Centres of Excellence comprising research groups from Chile's universities. Another relevant programme is the Millennium Science Initiative, which was launched in 1999 with support from the World Bank and also focuses on building centres of excellence, but more in basic science (Guim on 2013). Secondly, given Chile's relative technological deficiencies, its science and innovation policies have long had a strong focus on policy instruments to tap into foreign technology as a mechanism for accelerating the catch-up process. Traditionally, such Chilean policies focused on importing and adapting foreign technologies to the domestic context (Negoita and Block 2012; Nelson 2007) , as well as attracting investments from multinational corporations, which was another important channel for absorbing foreign technology and learning from more advanced economies (Alatorre and Razo 2010; Poniachik 2002 ). More recently, the government has launched new programmes to enhance Chile's participation in global innovation networks by enabling the physical establishment in Chile of foreign organizations, namely, the StartUp Chile programme to attract entrepreneurs from abroad to start innovative businesses in the country (Guim on et al. 2015) and the ICE programme.
The objective of the ICE programme was to contribute to strengthening national technological capabilities and industrial competitiveness through the establishment in Chile of ICEs led by foreign research organizations (which could be universities, applied research institutes, or R&D branches of firms) that would perform R&D and promote technology transfer in partnership with Chilean counterparts. The programme was designed to select a limited number of foreign research organizations and offer them substantial funding over a relatively long period, so that they could reach a critical mass. The foreign research organizations selected as the target group were to concentrate on the applied side of the science spectrum, with a strong focus on supporting industrial innovation and technology commercialization in Chile's strategic industries. Hence, as already stated, they can be considered as focused on innovation and advanced technological development according to Hellströ m's (2014) classification. In the words of a top CORFO executive:
Chile is among the world's top producers of copper and salmon. Other industries where Chile has clear competitive advantages are foods, wine and astronomy. Through the ICE programme and other ongoing initiatives, we are attempting to become not only a top producer but also a technology leader in these industries. This requires developing cross-cutting platform technologies (e.g. biotech-nanotech-software) that may be relevant to several of those strategic industries.
The programme also aimed to address barriers to university-industry collaboration and technology commercialization in Chile. Thus, in addition to developing new solutions for Chilean industry, the programme was expected to foster changes in terms of collaboration within the national innovation system. The programme was a clear attempt to use a policy instrument to upgrade domestic science and innovation capacity through intense collaboration with foreign partners. As explained in our interviews with some of the main policymakers behind the design of the programme:
One of the reasons for attracting world-class research institutes from abroad was to produce a demonstration effect on our universities and firms, by introducing best practices on universityindustry collaboration.
Our aim was to bring into the country foreign research institutions with demonstrated experience in linking with industry and commercializing technology, so that they would produce a shaking effect to address a key gap that we had identified in the national innovation system. The centres are expected to foster linkages and joint projects with Chilean universities and companies, leading to more relevant, multidisciplinary and applied research.
In addition to their focus on connecting with domestic industries, the ICEs were required to hire Chilean scientists and to establish collaboration agreements with Chilean universities, so as to ensure the establishment of the appropriate linkages with local actors and lead to knowledge spill-overs and learning opportunities. However, to emphasize their independence, the ICEs are not located within universities. They are each established at an independent office, not necessarily close to one another, nor within a dedicated building in the proximity of a major university or science park.
Although the ICEs were to focus primarily on applied research to support advanced technological development and innovation, they were also expected to contribute to some extent to the training of young scientists. The different ICEs have achieved this by hosting and co-supervising PhD students and postdocs from national universities or by participating in postgraduate programmes run by Chilean universities offering specific modules, seminars, and invited lectures.
Application, selection, and funding
The ICE programme engaged in a two-stage selection process for grants that required different degrees of matching and a gradual decrease in base funding. In the first call (2009), each ICE was offered a non-refundable matching grant of up to US$ 19.5 million for a 10-year period, subject to a minimum co-financing equivalent to 59.5 per cent of the grant received. In the second call (2012), the maximum grant was reduced to US$ 12.8 million per centre for an 8-year period, and the minimum co-financing increased to 87.5 per cent of the grant. Rather than engaging in ad hoc negotiations with potential international partners on a one-by-one basis, the Chilean government decided to organize the programme around an open call for proposals with a structured application and selection process. The call for proposals was preceded by international outreach efforts to raise awareness of the programme and to encourage leading research organizations to submit proposals. This outreach campaign was supported by Chilean Embassies and Consulates abroad. Potential candidates were asked to submit an initial expression of interest, which was followed by pre-competitive dialogue with representatives of CORFO aimed at better modulating the final proposals. This also created more acceptance of the programme within Chile, as indicated by a quote from an interviewed high-level policymaker:
The round of initial contacts by Chilean Embassies and subsequent international missions was essential in order to explore whether there was real interest in the programme in the best research organizations around the world specialized in areas of relevance to Chilean industry. In the early stage, there was some scepticism and there were many critical voices about the programme in Chile, including from our National Innovation Council. An important milestone was a mission to Germany organized in parallel with an official visit of the President of Chile, where the President aroused a strong interest in the programme in the German government and the Fraunhofer Institute.
The selected foreign organizations (Table 2) had very diverse motivations for participating in an ICE under this programme. In addition to the obvious benefit of gaining access to public research funding from the Chilean government, interviewed stakeholders indicated that their research organizations had been searching for opportunities to expand their capacity for technology commercialization and for engaging in contract research with firms outside their countries of origin, thus generating new income streams. Hence, they saw the ICE sometimes as a 'sales office' for their parent organization. Most of the foreign organizations also aimed to escalate their activities beyond Chile towards the rest of Latin America. Furthermore, their presence in Chile offered the institutions new opportunities for international scientific collaboration and gave them access to a 'natural laboratory' for certain research fields such Science and Public Policy, 2017, Vol. 0, No. 0 as mining, agriculture, or astronomy, where Chile enjoys unique natural conditions that these institutions lack in their countries of origin but are relevant for field research. Moreover, interviewed ICE directors indicated that, for research organizations that have ambitions to become global players, the ICE programme was taken as an opportunity for experimenting with the internationalization challenges in a small and safe country like Chile. These different motivations to establish in Chile are illustrated further with the following quotes from our interviews with the ICE directors:
The most obvious reason why we landed in Chile is that we received very generous funding from the government and from the local universities that we partnered with. Other reasons include the attractiveness of Chile as a location to conduct certain types of research given its extreme natural environments and the fact that the seasons for agriculture overlap with those of the US, allowing for around-the-year testing of certain technologies. In addition, the strategic ambition of our institution for the next years is to become more global by opening up at least one branch campus on every continent, and this represented an excellent opportunity to establish our first branch campus in Latin America.
We learnt about the ICE programme in Chile just at a time when our institute had decided to embrace a more ambitious internationalization strategy. It was good timing. The incentives offered under the programme made it very attractive, and the dialogue with CORFO worked well. We were convinced that the Chilean market offered interesting opportunities to commercialize our technology and develop new solutions. We also perceived that Chile was a safe country in which to operate in the Latin American context. Their full proposals needed to include a detailed explanation of the research lines to be conducted by the ICE and commitments to performance measures, which would form the basis for monitoring and evaluation. CORFO, with the support of an international panel of experts, rated the proposals on the basis of their potential for: creating new solutions to increase the competitiveness of Chilean industries; engaging in world-class research projects; mobilizing marketoriented collaborative research with national universities; and contributing to the development of advanced human capital in Chile. In other words, the proposals were rated on strategic fit with the overall goals of the programme. However, some of our interviewees criticized different aspects of the selection process with regard to the capacity for evaluation and how strategic fit was eventually assessed, as this remained opaque. This is illustrated by the following quotes from ICE representatives:
Our centre was selected, but the international evaluation panel rejected what we thought were some of our best research lines, because they thought they were not innovative enough. The problem is that they did not seem to understand our project proposals well, and we were not given the opportunity to defend our position. So we just had to forget these lines of research and focus on others, which was a suboptimal solution. We participated in the application process, and invested a lot of effort and money in preparing a sound proposal. We had even initiated some research projects in Chile before presenting the proposal to better understand the local context and to make sure that it was interesting to us. Along the process, we received very positive feedback from CORFO, but finally our proposal was not selected. These truncated expectations generated a lot of frustration in our organization and, inevitably, our organization has been very reluctant to engage in new projects in Chile. Of course the process is very competitive and cultural barriers make communication challenging, but I think CORFO did not set the expectations right. In addition, we did not receive appropriate feedback on why our proposal was rejected. Perhaps CORFO should have had more follow-up with our organization and offered early on some alternative modes of collaboration, even with less public funding.
Overall, a total of 13 ICEs have so far been established in Chile through the ICE programme ( Table 2 ). All of them are located in Chile's capital, Santiago, although most of them operate projects spanning across the country's regions. The ICEs include foreign organizations from seven different countries: three from the USA, two from Australia, and eight from European countries. These include universities (e.g. UC Davis, University of Queensland) applied research organizations (e.g. Fraunhofer, CSIRO) and R&D branches of firms (e.g. Pfizer, Telefonica). Some of the selected organizations, such as Wageningen UR, Pfizer, and Telefonica, were already present in the country but created a new R&D centre through the ICE programme. Note also that one research institute, Fraunhofer, was selected under both calls to establish two ICEs in different areas, although both were finally grouped under the same organizational entity, called Fraunhofer Research Chile. All ICEs took the name of, and are led and owned by, the foreign partner, so could be considered satellites of their parent organizations, but with partnerships with Chilean organizations.
After a first call for proposals for ICE in 2009, a second call was launched in 2012. Whereas the first call targeted only non-for-profit universities and research institutes ('institutional track'), the second call added a new 'business track' aimed at attracting R&D departments from multinational companies. However, funding offered for the business track was lower and over a shorter period, while requiring a higher extent of co-financing by the foreign entity.
2 Using the same application and selection process, the second track led to the selection of five new ICEs under the institutional track and four ICEs under the business track.
Implementation and governance
All the ICEs are located in newly established offices, generally in modern office buildings in the business quarters of Santiago de Chile. As mentioned earlier, they were not necessarily located in close proximity to national universities or to one another. The ICEs had to hire Chilean scientists and to establish collaboration agreements with Chilean universities, but it could be observed that there were different modalities to realize the partnerships. Some of the ICEs, like the one led by Wageningen UR, were established initially not as a fully owned affiliate of the foreign institution but as a joint foundation with a group of national universities, with a local office staffed by Chileans contracted by the ICE who collaborated with researchers from the partner organization in projects. Their governance board was comprised of a number of founding partners. Most other ICEs were held in full ownership by the foreign partner, but they signed strategic alliances with either one or several local universities. For example, Telefonica initially established a partnership with just one Chilean university, whereas Inria with nine. Governing such local partnerships is not an easy task, as evidenced by the following quotes from our interviews with ICE directors:
Establishing alliances with local universities is easy in the proposal stage, but once the project started we encountered many difficulties. However, the programme is very rigid, and it is hard to break an agreement that was included in the original proposal, even if it is not working.
We established collaboration agreements with several universities. Our aim was to identify the most relevant scientific groups and escalate their research. In addition to collaboration with the institutions, we have hired some university professors on a 50% basis, so that they could maintain their appointments at university. However, these kinds of agreements were sometimes difficult to monitor and led to some questions such as the potential duplication of funding for the same research projects or conflicts around the attribution of research results.
Once the centre got started, we had to spend a lot of time and effort negotiating contracts with our partner institutions, in particular with regard to the ownership of intellectual property rights and the distribution of licensing royalties. We needed to align expectations, and we experienced unexpected conflicts with some of our partner universities.
Beyond collaboration with national universities, the main focus of the ICE programme is to develop new solutions to increase the competitiveness of Chilean industries through joint research projects, contract research and technology commercialization. As shown in Table 2 , all ICEs are clearly aligned with the needs of strategic industries in Chile, but some focus on specific sectors (such as mining, nutrition or renewable energy), whereas others embrace platform technologies with applications across several industries (such as IT, biotechnology or nanotechnology). The following quotes from our interviews with ICE directors illustrate the challenges of establishing linkages with local industries, relating to local firms' lack of absorptive capacity and to other institutional and cultural issues, as discussed in Section 2.2:
The most critical issue that will determine the success of the centres of excellence relates to their capacity to establish fruitful linkages with local firms. From the beginning, we knew that this was a challenging task; we had doubts on whether there were sufficient numbers of local firms with the absorptive capacity required to take full advantage of the kind of research we were planning to undertake.
Building a relationship of trust with Chilean firms is harder than we thought initially. Chilean firms normally search for ready-touse technology and are reluctant to finance the development of new technologies assuming a risk. They are not used either to participating in research consortia with other firms. There are cultural barriers such as lack of trust and low propensity to collaborate when it comes to engaging with firms.
Although initially it was slow and cumbersome to find firms that were interested in collaborating with us, with time we are seeing that things are changing. It is becoming more a demand pool; companies are starting to come to us directly, and we try to solve their problems or to bring collaboration with other research groups from our institution's country of origin, thus facilitating international connections.
As discussed in Section 2.2, ICE programmes involving foreign partners are expected to bring benefits to host countries in terms of catching up and also to foreign partners in terms of tapping into funding and access to knowledge (see also Section 4.2). The Chilean ICEs illustrate how these two motivations can converge. In particular, respondents indicated that several of the ICEs have established research collaborations with foreign multinationals operating in Chile. For example, Mentor Graphics, a leading firm in microcircuit design from the USA, and Komatsu, a mining corporation from Japan, which had arrived years ago to Chile, have recently expanded their R&D activity in the country through new cooperation agreements with Inria and Fraunhofer, respectively. Moreover, as stated by one interviewed ICE director, the presence of the ICEs has brought the unintended benefit of contributing to firms from their countries of origin expanding their R&D activities in Chile:
In the last year, we have been contacted by several companies from our country of origin that were exploring the possibility of investing in Chile and engaging in new R&D activities in the country. Some companies were interested in partnering with us in this process and saw us as an intermediary within Chile's national innovation system. At the same time, the Chilean government has also asked us to participate in some commercial visits of multinational companies from our country.
In addition, interviewed stakeholders perceived that the programme's implementation is leading to closer international linkages between Chile and other countries, be it through joint projects between the ICEs and other research groups in their countries of origin; through the temporary exchange of students and senior scientists; or through the participation of Chile in foreign research funding schemes. For example, Fraunhofer's and Inria's Chilean ICEs are participating as partners in projects funded by the European Framework Programme.
Despite these perceived mutual benefits for both the host country and the foreign organizations involved in the ICE, they also reported on remaining criticisms as regards the division of benefits. Despite the advantages, throughout its history the ICE program has often been criticized because of the generous funding provided to foreign institutions, which could be used instead to strengthen national universities and R&D institutes that are much in need of additional investments to build critical mass. In the words of a representative of CORFO:
We need to constantly address the concern that the program might lead to some sort of 'techno-colonialism', whereby foreign investors in R&D focus their efforts of commercializing in Chile technologies they had developed in their home countries.
Finally, it is worth reflecting on the role that the Chilean government played in the implementation stage, through the national innovation agency CORFO. As the ICE programme receives a large amount of public funding, 3 it is critical for CORFO to ensure that taxpayers' money is used efficiently. Therefore, monitoring and evaluation are of critical importance, as discussed in the following section. In addition, in our interviews with the ICE directors, all of them suggested that CORFO should adopt a more proactive approach, acting as a broker between the ICEs and Chilean research organizations and firms. In other words, through its local connections and knowledge, CORFO should contribute to overcoming the frictions and barriers to cooperation described above. Some interviewees also argued that CORFO should aim at fostering closer cooperation among the ICE themselves, to share good practices and identify possible areas for scientific collaboration, while coordinating research agendas to exploit synergies and avoid duplications. Along these lines, in May 2015, following the arrival of the nine new ICEs selected under the second call, CORFO organized the first meeting bringing together representative from all ICEs, with a view to fostering constructive dialogue on role that they were expected to play in the development of the national innovation system. The meeting was also taken as an opportunity to foster interaction among the ICEs' directors, which could lead to future collaborations.
Monitoring and evaluation
In the proposal stage, as mentioned in Section 4.2, the ICE presented a research plan and a set of key performance measures, which would form the basis for subsequent monitoring and evaluation. CORFO regularly monitors the activity of the ICEs, focusing on operational and financial issues, so as to comply with Chilean legislation regulating the use of public subsidies. However, according to a director of one ICE:
The monitoring processes are very rigid and inefficient. We are subject to an administrative slavery. Every single expense is audited by CORFO with a very precarious IT system which is very costly for us. We spend too much time dealing with bureaucracy.
We also had problems at the launch stage with a delay in receiving the financial contribution from CORFO, and we were forced to ask our headquarters for additional funding in order to maintain our operations and pay our employees. This resulted in an unnecessary delay to our operations that could have been prevented with more agile financial and monitoring processes.
In addition to ongoing monitoring by the ICEs themselves and CORFO, the ICEs are subject to a commissioned interim evaluation every 3 years. Such evaluations are performed by CORFO with the support of international experts. They are based on a report prepared by the ICEs' directors summarizing the activities and results achieved, and comparing these with their commitments in the original proposal. In parallel, the ICEs have to present a plan for the following 3 years, which is also evaluated by CORFO. The evaluation of the ICE programme is a very complex exercise that requires a flexible model, balancing quantitative metrics and qualitative assessments, and accommodating differences between scientific fields. Some of our interviewees (both from CORFO and the ICEs) suggested possible ways to improve the evaluation process:
Currently, we have too many indicators for evaluation. We should try to focus on a smaller set of key performance indicators (e.g. income from industry, patents, etc.). In addition, the process of financial reporting and audits needs to be simplified.
The interim evaluation should be organized in such a way that CORFO provides early feedback and supports the centres in elaborating their proposals for the second stage, so that they become better adapted to CORFO's expectations. This would also help to avoid unnecessary negotiations and delays after presenting the interim evaluation reports.
We should move towards a less hierarchical, two-way evaluation, where the foreign headquarters of the Chilean centres also participate in the evaluation process, to ensure that there is a mutual benefit that will guarantee the continuation and expansion of the centres. In addition, the centres should evaluate the role of CORFO, with a view to improving the programme's efficiency in the future.
CORFO should be more flexible with the interim evaluations. Centres that modify their original commitments should not be penalized if there is a good reason. Research is by definition a very risky activity and failure should be tolerated, so that centres have sufficient flexibility to take corrective action on time if some their research lines are not meeting expectations. Likewise, the centres should be acknowledged for new activities or outcomes that were not contemplated in their initial proposals.
On making an interim evaluation, CORFO may interrupt its funding to an ICE if it is not meeting the agreed upon objectives. The four ICEs established under the first call have recently undergone their first interim evaluation; Fraunhofer in 2014 and the others in 2015. Partly as a result of this first interim evaluation, it was decided that Wageningen UR would abandon the ICE programme and would therefore stop receiving baseline funding from CORFO. However, this ICE temporarily maintained its operations in Chile through new programmes and tools to build a long-term relationship in the area of agriculture and processed foods between Chile and Wageningen UR, but eventually closed fully in 2016.
Respondents indicated that CORFO also planned to undertake an overall evaluation of the programme sometime in the future. Such global evaluation would need to focus on assessing the additionality effect of the programme vis-a-vis the counterfactual alternative of dedicating those resources to R&D organizations in Chilean ownership. As discussed earlier, such additionality derives from the capacity of the ICEs to develop new solutions for Chilean industry and to instigate a systemic change in the national innovation system, improving university-industry collaboration and enhancing the commercialization capacity of the national science base, while forging closer linkages with foreign sources of knowledge. A challenge mentioned in relation to monitoring and evaluation was that overall programme evaluations would need to consider the alignment of the ICE programme with the wider policy mix to promote innovation in Chile. Along these lines, one of the interviewed policymakers said:
We need to reflect further about the interactions between the different policy instruments in place, to make sure that the policy mix is coherent and that the potential synergies between different policy instruments are exploited. The ICE programme serves several purposes in the national innovation system but needs to be complemented with other policy instruments to be efficient.
General evaluations of the programme were thus indicated as important to foster policy learning and to inspire programme reforms. For example, an important decision to be taken on the basis of such evaluation is whether to issue new calls for proposals in the future, or rather concentrate resources in existing ICEs and perhaps provide the best of them with more funding. Overall, a key challenge indicated in this regard is to ensure that the new ICEs remain active and expand beyond the 10 years of public support envisioned under the programme's first call. The ICEs' sustainability depends on their capacity to earn income from contract research, patent licensing, and other sources of competitive public funding, in addition to some extent of core funding. According to some of the ICE directors interviewed, the target should be to evolve towards a funding model of around one third income from industry, one-third competitive public funding and one-third core public funding. Core funding may come from both the Chilean government and the countries of origin. Therefore, it is important for the programme to demonstrate not only local impact, but also benefits for the home institutions that can justify future public funding. Such benefits may arise in terms of new opportunities for firms from those countries to expand into Chile using the ICEs as local intermediaries; new technology generated in Chile that can be used at home or exported to other countries; new opportunities for international scientific collaboration; and so forth.
Discussion
The Chilean ICE programme represents a case of a dedicated innovation policy instrument to develop ICE by attracting foreign research organizations. It provides a useful example of how developing or emerging countries such as Chile can accelerate technological catching-up by establishing centres of excellence with world-class research organizations from abroad. As most of the ICEs have only recently started their operations, it is too early for a full-blown impact analysis, although some of them have already shown substantial progress, as discussed above, in linking with local universities and firms to promote innovation and technology diffusion. A more comprehensive evaluation of the programme's success will only be feasible after some more years have elapsed (see also Guim on et al., 2016) , but nonetheless some reflections that can inform the design of ICEs emerge from our study. We now provide a number of reflections that have emerged in our analysis of the different phases of the set-up of the Chilean ICEs (outlined in Section 2.1 and Table 1 ), mirroring them with views in the extant literature on potential benefits, risks and challenges as discussed in Section 2.2.
Benefits: international knowledge diffusion and capacity building for innovation and advanced technological development
From an assessment of the type of foreign organizations attracted and stakeholders' perceptions on their initial performance, we judge that the programme has been successful at attracting leading international institutions to conduct applied R&D, with the potential to apply positive externalities on Chile's national innovation system. Stakeholders felt that the high-level diplomatic support was vital in evoking interest among foreign partners and creating buy-in in the host country itself. As the findings of our study indicate, in the design stage it was explicitly considered that the ICE should target strategic sectors and also improve innovation system weaknesses such as limited university-industry collaboration. The findings indicate that such a purposeful design stimulates activities towards realizing these strategic aims: the ICEs established linkages with Chilean universities that led to joint PhDs and postdocs; and, although initially with difficulty (due to reported low levels of absorptive capacity), the ICEs have made connections with local firms and a demand for their expertise is developing.
Although the literature generally highlights the contribution of this type of international research collaboration towards the host country catching-up by establishing knowledge flows from foreign partners towards the host country (Beerkens 2009; Fu et al. 2011; Manning et al. 2008) , our study suggests that there are several reverse flows: the presence of an ICE also seems to create better possibilities for companies from the partner countries to initiate collaborations thanks to the presence of an ICE in their field; it enables foreign partners to undertake research in settings they do not have in their home countries; it provides access to new streams of funding; and it serves as a testing ground for internationalization efforts. Tentatively, these findings indicate that ICEs also contribute to building global innovation ecosystems of firms, universities, and research institutes, around a particular area, which transcend the boundaries of national innovation systems.
5.2 Risks and challenges: balancing the interests of both host and foreign parties to ensure sustainability Despite initial perceived benefits materializing, the design and implementation process of the Chilean ICE also presented several challenges from the stakeholders' perspective, some of which could even put the legitimacy and longevity of the ICE at risk. In line with earlier ideas by Pfotenhauer et al. (2016) and Hénard et al. (2012) , these challenges relate to idiosyncrasies of partners in both host country and home countries of the foreign partners that lead to continuous negotiation and sense-making to achieve convergence between host and foreign partners. Our analysis of the Chilean ICE programme case suggests that the rights, responsibilities, and modus operandi of both the host government and the foreign institution should be clearly articulated from the outset in contracts or memoranda of understanding that commit the different parties and reduce the risks of misunderstandings and conflict in the implementation stage (leading, for example, to accusations of 'techno-colonialism' -see also Guim on et al. 2016) . Ultimately, negotiation and sense-making efforts are of critical importance throughout the different stages of the programme (design, application, implementation, monitoring).
Therefore, beyond obtaining a clear idea about the form, function, and deliverables of the ICE on the part of the host country during the design phase, it is also important to communicate such ideas to the foreign partner who is 'being attracted'. In the Chilean ICE programme case, according to stakeholders interviewed, such a dialogue was hindered by a lack of transparency on selection criteria and evaluation procedures. Here, a main challenge seems to be the different explanations of strategic fit between foreign applicants and host countries. Application procedures that do not allow for open dialogue and learning between host country funding institutions and foreign organizations may result in badly understood proposal rejections or may lead to expectations that cannot be met during implementation. Or they may lead to the programme design not accommodating local realities in terms of partnership building; this can percolate to the implementation phase, as shown by the cumbersome negotiations between the ICEs and Chilean universities. A factor here may also have been the ICEs' location: although our interviewed stakeholders did not explicitly reflect on this, we judge that the decision to locate ICEs away from partners may have emphasized independence, but could also be seen as a hindrance to local embedding and partnership building. Proximity between partners is generally advocated for Centres of Excellence (Hellströ m 2014) and has for example been put in practice in the CREATE programme in Singapore (Sidhu et al. 2014) . Hence, putting emphasis on enabling such open dialogue and mutual learning may contribute to better aligning the strategic interests of both sides in the ICE (host country funding institutions and research organizations on one side, and foreign research organizations on the other).
Lastly, such clarity on form, function, and deliverables also relates to a common understanding on indicators for the monitoring phase, in which in our case the foreign partners saw the funder (CORFO) as overly bureaucratic. Here, differences between host countries and countries of origin may play a role if these have different habits and procedures in relation to reporting and accountability (see also Li et al. 2016b ). Indeed, a key challenge of an ICE model appears to be that it is subject to a double monitoring and evaluation process: from the host country government that provides funding and from the home-based headquarters of the foreign partner. This dual embeddedness leads to greater administrative hassles and may potentially result in institutional conflicts (following Shams and Huisman 2016) .
This point is important in view of the longevity of ICEs: as Centres of Excellence typically need long-term financial support (see Guim on 2013; Hellströ m 2014), misunderstandings about expected modes of working, and outputs may lead to early cessation of funding (as happened, for example, to the Wageningen UR ICE). Furthermore, rigidity on the part of the funder may also ignore the experimental character of the innovation policy instrument and the potential for mutual learning. In line with previous studies (Borr as 2011; Klerkx et al. 2017) , our findings suggest the need for policy learning together with partners on how to shape ICEs and what complementary policy interventions are needed to optimize them.
An implication of this finding on the integration of mutual learning in the enactment of an innovation policy instrument aimed at cross-border collaboration, and recognizing its dual embeddedness, relates to the fact that there seem to be other types of absorptive capacity at play for operating an ICE than just the ability of firms in the host country to absorb knowledge. These concern: 1) absorptive capacity on both the host country's and the partner's part to interpret the implications of engaging with a cross-systemic policy instrument such as the attraction programme for the ICE; 2) the absorptive capacity to deal with working in a cross-cultural setting in an ICE (e.g. partner organizations' capacity to negotiate partnerships and effectively work in these partnerships, which involve staff from different countries). To develop such absorptive capacity, it may be necessary for some party to act as what has been called a cross-border broker (Ma et al. 2014; Manning and Roessler 2014) who contributes to learning and shaping mutual understanding between the different partners in the ICE. In the case of Chile, for CORFO to contribute better towards those ends, in the future its role should shift further from accountability and control towards facilitation of networking and mutual learning. It could do so by taking up the role of crossborder broker itself (see also Guim on et al. 2016) and hence broadening its mandate as a funder (following Klerkx and Leeuwis 2008) or delegating this role to another organization which may have a more neutral position (following Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009 ).
Conclusions
The literature suggests that creating ICE in which world-class research organizations collaborate with host country partners can contribute to assisting emerging countries in their process of catching-up in terms of developing science and innovation capacity (Archibugi and Pietrobelli 2003; Manning et al. 2010; Nelson 2007) and provide an opportunity for eminent applied research organizations, universities and corporate R&D branches of firms to expand the scope of their research and to access additional sources of funding (Berger and Hofer 2011; Jonkers and Cruz-Castro 2010; Pfotenhauer et al. 2016; Zacharewicz et al. 2017) . Our study shows that realizing these benefits was a main driver of the Chilean ICE programme's design. Furthermore, in the stakeholders' perception, some of these benefits appear to be in the process of materializing. In order to realize benefits for both host country and international partners, our study suggests that setting up an ICE (being a Complex International Science, Technology and Innovation Partnership) requires a careful consideration of design choices and, possibly even more importantly, continuous reflection on these choices. This is needed because of possibly differing strategic interests of host country and institution and inherent differences linked to idiosyncrasies of the countries from which participating organizations come (e.g. in terms of views on, and expectations of, partnership building and evaluation processes) as well as the ICE's dual embeddedness in both the host country's and the foreign partner's innovation system. Lack of reflection and an absence of learning on ICE design choices may result in threats to the longevity of the ICE in question.
The study highlighted the need for both the host country and foreign partners to have absorptive capacity, but with different interpretations. First, this kind of innovation policy instrument for crossborder collaboration in the form of a dedicated programme to attract foreign research organizations will most likely only be fruitful in the presence of a threshold level of absorptive capacity in the host country to enable the desired catching-up. This refers to domestic absorptive capacity in which host country researchers, universities, firms and entrepreneurs need to have sufficient scientific and technological capabilities to be able benefit from the potential spill-overs associated with attracting global R&D. Second, our study also suggests the need for another type of specific absorptive capacity, which could be called absorptive capacity for cross-border collaboration in order to be able to participate in ICEs. Development of the latter type of absorptive capacity requires not only articulation of internationalization strategies as well as related capacity building amongst partners (e.g. in international negotiation, cross-cultural communication) but also with the funding agencies enacting the innovation policies that induce ICE. In this context, this study has suggested that a higher involvement of those agencies in facilitating and brokering cross-cultural understanding may be useful.
This article has presented an account of early experiences with the Chilean ICE programme and this therefore only allows for tentative conclusions based on a single case. Thus, further research is needed to develop broader theory and sound policy recommendations. Future research could look at other international experiences, which may provide cases for cross-country comparative research. Such research could address topics such as: 1) how policy learning relating to ICEs takes place and how this translates into the shaping of innovation policy instruments that aim to enable the attraction of foreign R&D (in terms of how calls are formulated, monitoring and evaluation processes, and so forth); 2) how experiences in ICEs are being translated into partner organizations in terms of internationalization policies and capacity building; 3) how partnership arrangements underlying ICEs change over time and how this influences ICEs' organizational shape (in terms of location, funding, staffing); and 4) the long-term effect of these programmes on science, technology, and innovation capacity in host countries.
Notes
1. Chile's population in 2013 was 17.6 million with a per annum income per capita of 15,230 current US$ (World Bank, http:// data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators). The country's expenditure on R&D stood at 0.39% of GDPa very low figure not only with respect to the OECD average (2.4%) but also compared to other Latin American countries such as Brazil (1.19%) or Argentina (0.65%). 2. Funding for the business track was limited to US$ 8 million over four years, with the foreign corporation contributing at least twice the amount of the grant.
3. According to information provided to us by CORFO, the annual budget for this programme is currently around US$30 million, making it the most costly among CORFO's programmes to promote innovation in Chile.
